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Abstract
The Scientific Revolution is often associated with a transition to a
“mechanistic” world view. However, “mechanization” is not the term
that best captures the distinctive nature of modern physics: “math-
ematization” would be a better characterization. Modern physics at-
tempts to find mathematical relations between quantities, and does
not require that these relations be interpreted in terms of mechanisms.
Moreover, in modern physics there are cases in which it is unnatural
to give the mathematical formalism a mechanistic interpretation, even
if “mechanistic” is broadly construed. Both on the level of ontology
and that of explanation physics turns out to be more general and lib-
eral than what is suggested by the catchphrase that physics explains by
identifying mechanisms. Although mechanistic explanation remains an
important conceptual tool, in particular for achieving understanding,
it is not the only one available and cannot lay claim to fundamentality.
1 Introduction
In his book “The Mechanization of the World Picture” [1], the historian of
science E.J. Dijksterhuis famously described the transition from ancient and
medieval to modern science, in particular physics, as the replacement of oc-
cult qualities by clear and empirically accessible “mechanical” concepts like
the size, velocity and acceleration of particles. Newtonian mechanics, the
culmination of the Scientific Revolution, established mathematically formu-
lated laws between quantities of this sort. The term “mechanization” seems
apt for this transition, and it is true that the treatment of physical prob-
lems on the basis of mechanics became an ideal of physical science in the
seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. However, as Dijksterhuis
1
himself already noted in the epilogue of his book [1, p. 498], one should bear
in mind that
the science called mechanics had emancipated itself in the 17th
century from its origins in the study of machines, and had devel-
oped into an independent branch of mathematical physics, deal-
ing with the motion of material objects and finding in the theory
of machines only one of its numerous practical applications.
As Dijksterhuis makes clear in his epilogue, with hindsight the fundamen-
tal contrast between ancient and medieval physics on the one hand and
(early) modern physics on the other is not that the former sometimes uses
explanations involving teleology or analogies with organisms whereas the lat-
ter models processes with concepts that come from the world of machines.
Rather, the basic difference is that while ancient and medieval physics occa-
sionally used mathematical tools, modern physics is essentially mathemati-
cal, defining core concepts in a mathematical way and formulating laws in
mathematical language. Mathematical reasoning is by its nature abstract,
and it is not self-evident that the metaphor of a “machine” will always be
natural or even applicable for mathematically described processes, not even
for processes within the domain of the science of mechanics itself.
The novel mathematical frameworks that were invented for the treat-
ment of mechanical problems in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
strengthen this point. As we shall see, these new approaches have led in
the direction of growing abstraction and have made thinking in terms of
what we intuitively would call “mechanisms” less than obvious. The devel-
opment of new branches of physics in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
have further contributed to the general picture of increasing abstraction and
distance from everyday intuition, also on the level of explanation.
Still, even though mechanistic explanations are not always the most usual
and natural, one could hold on to the idea that such explanations are possible
in principle, and provide a kind of basic understanding of physical processes.
As we shall discuss in section 3, it is indeed true that mechanical models can
very often be constructed in physics—this was proved by Poincare´ at the
end of the nineteenth century. However, this existence in principle depends
on a rather trivial underdetermination argument, and it is far from clear
that it carries epistemological weight.
The fundamental status of mechanistic explanations was dealt a further
blow by the advent of quantum mechanics in the twentieth century. It is
a general trait of mechanistic explanations that they analyze the behavior
of physical systems in terms of these systems’ material constituents and
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the interactions between them: mechanistic explanations are meant to be
“decompositional” [13]. However, quantum theory has unsettled even such
very general mechanistic conceptions. The very notion that a composite
system can be fully analyzed in terms of the properties of its constituent
parts and the relations between them has become debatable: according to
standard interpretational ideas quantum theory attributes holistic features
to physical systems. Thus even the most basic ingredients of the notion of
a “mechanism” become moot.
Evidently, this unstable basis of the applicability of the concept of a
“mechanism” has consequences for the status of mechanistic explanation
in physics. Although there certainly are many cases in which mechanistic
intuitions are helpful and provide understanding1, the associated pictures
and concepts cannot lay claim to fundamentality. There are fundamental
physical processes in which the usefulness of mechanistic modelling is far
from obvious, and in which other types of reasoning appear more fitting.
On balance, mechanistic explanations cannot claim to possess a privileged
status.
As we shall argue, this points in the direction of a pluralist conception
of explanation and understanding in physics, according to which contextual
and pragmatic factors are important in deciding which conceptual frame-
work is the most appropriate. Mechanistic explanation is one of the tools
present in the “conceptual toolbox”, but depending on the specifics of the
problem case other explanatory strategies may be preferable.
2 Mechanics and Mechanisms
The intuitive attractiveness and power of descriptions in terms of mech-
anisms, in the original and literal sense of material objects whose parts
interact via pushes and pulls, is beyond dispute. We are so familiar with
the operation of pulleys, drive shafts and effects of collisions, that an anal-
ysis of complicated processes in such terms provides a strong conceptual
grip on what is happening. Cartesian physics lived up to exactly this ideal
of mechanistic explanation, which accounts for a great deal of its contem-
porary popularity. However, in the Scientific Revolution Cartesian physics
proved just a brief phase: its framework was insufficiently flexible for the
formulation of laws of motion of the kind finally stated by Newton (in partic-
ular, as Newton argued, the law of inertia cannot adequately be stated in a
1We associate “understanding” with qualitative insight in the behavior of physical
systems, in the sense of [6]
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Cartesian material plenum without an independent non-material space-time
background that serves to define what straight lines and equal time spans
are).
Classical mechanics, in the form given to it by Newton, accordingly does
not conform to the original mechanistic ideals. On the one hand, in addi-
tion to the traditional mechanical concepts of size, velocity and acceleration,
there is a non-material arena, formed by space and time, that influences the
evolution of physical processes; on the other hand, in addition to the familiar
interactions via contact between impenetrable bodies action-at-a-distance
forces are introduced. It is well known how Newton’s contemporaries for
this reason accused Newton of reintroducing mysterious occult qualities and
of spoiling the progress that had been made towards clarity through a mech-
anistic understanding of the world.
Nevertheless, due to its enormous predictive success the new Newtonian
framework before too long became the dominant scientific paradigm. A new
norm for “mechanistic” became thus established: mechanistic explanation
came to signify the decomposition of a material system into constituent par-
ticles, the specification of interactions via Newtonian forces between these
particles, and the proof that these interactions (defined against the back-
ground of a pre-given space-time) were able to predict the observed behavior
of the total system.
The forces in the original Newtonian scheme are simple “inverse square”
central forces, i.e. forces falling off with the inverse square of the mutual dis-
tance between the interacting particles (1/r2) and directed along the straight
line connecting them. However, at the end of the eighteenth and the be-
ginning of the nineteenth centuries it was found that this simple type of in-
teraction could not account for what happens in phenomena involving mag-
netism and moving electrical charges, so that more complicated interaction
formulas had to be written down. For example, in order to accommodate the
interaction between moving electrical charges within an action-at-a-distance
framework one needs forces that are not directed along the line connecting
the particles and that depend not only on the particle positions but also on
their velocities and accelerations. As a result, the mechanistic ideal had to
be adapted once again. Instead of requiring that a process should be ex-
plained in terms of localized particles and Newtonian central forces between
them, it now became sufficient to give an analysis in which the total system
is decomposed into material parts with mathematically stated force laws
acting between them—in addition, new properties which did not possess an
immediately obvious mechanical interpretation, like electrical charge, had
to be accepted.
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Meanwhile, it should be recognized that the adoption of this “Newto-
nian” type of explanation, in terms of parts dynamically producing the
whole, depends on a particular perspective on classical mechanics, which
is not the only possible one. The mathematically formulated theory does
not unavoidably lead to the Newtonian picture of a history unfolding in
time, in which physical systems at one instant work together, via their in-
teractions, to generate the immediate future. To start with, the idea of the
“production” of new situations from the old ones as time passes does not sit
well with the formalism of mechanics, or even with the structure of math-
ematical physics in general. This relates to the notorious problem of the
“‘flow of time”: time occurs in mathematical physics as a parameter in the
same way as the spatial coordinates, which makes it impossible to define a
preferred now. There is no privileged point on the time axis, just as there is
no preferred here. A fortiori, there is no definable motion of a flow of time,
just as there is no shifting here within the formalism.
Of course, the notions of “here” and “now” do become applicable once
an external spatio-temporal viewpoint is introduced, for example connected
to an observer who makes use of the theory. From the internal theoretical
viewpoint both the concepts of now and here, and the notion of the flow of
time, are merely indexical, deriving their meaning from a reference to such an
external viewpoint, and not inherent in the theory itself. This may be taken
as a first indication that the choice of explanations in terms of “productive
mechanisms” itself has a pragmatic and contextual background, relating to
the interests of the user of the theory.
In any case, interpretations of the theory of mechanics that do not start
from the assumption that the theory describes how systems change while
time flows are possible, and are moreover natural when we look at the formal-
ism from an abstract point of view. Such interpretations view the universe as
laid out not only in space, but also in time, as a four-dimensional “block”—
the block universe, which comprises the whole of history without making a
distinction between an absolute (as opposed to an indexically defined) Past,
Present and Future.
Patterns of explanation that fit in with this “static” perspective were in
fact already proposed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In these
alternatives to the original Newtonian approach (associated with names like
Maupertuis, Euler, Lagrange and Hamilton) one does not focus on instan-
taneous forces that change the present physical state, but rather asks which
path will be followed by a mechanical system (e.g. a particle) if it is given
that it finds itself at position x1 at instant t1 and is located at x2 at another
time t2. The Principle of Least Action (or more generally the Principle of
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Stationary Action) states that among all possible continuous curves connect-
ing x1 and x2 in the given time interval, the one actually realized minimizes
(more generally: makes stationary) the “action” S =
∫ t2
t1
Ldt.
In this formula the function L is the Lagrangian, defined as the difference
between kinetic and potential energy of the system: L = T −V . The kinetic
energy T (12mv
2 for a point particle) will involve squares of velocities, the
potential energy V will usually be only a function of positions, so that the
total Lagrangian T − V is a function of positions and velocities.
The Principle of Least Action may suggest that a system “chooses”, from
all logically possible evolutions between t1 and t2, the one that makes the
action
∫ t2
t1
Ldt minimal. This invites teleological patterns of explanation:
the system, “knowing” that it will have to arrive at x2 at time t2, fulfils this
task in the most economical way at its disposal.
Obviously, such anthropomorphic terminology, although not uncommon
in the practice of physics, should not be taken seriously. Mathematically
speaking, the Newtonian and Lagrangian approaches are equivalent: one can
be derived from the other, so that arguments on the basis of the principle
of least action need not introduce irreducibly novel ontological ingredients.
Still, in explanations starting from the minimization of the action the focus
is different than in Newtonian explanations: one now looks at the total
path (if the system comprises more than one particle this path is defined
in phase space), stretched out in time, and compares different possibilities.
By contrast, in the Newtonian approach one focuses on the instantaneous
state and computes how this state evolves in response to causal influences.
This difference illustrates how the same mathematical theory (in this case
classical mechanics) may be cast in various forms and how different patterns
of explanation can become plausible depending on these different forms. In
fact, the Lagrangian formulation is not the only non-Newtonian form that
can be given to classical mechanics: the Hamiltonian and Hamilton-Jacobi
formalism are still other alternatives, and there are more.
These more modern approaches in mechanics usually do not work with
causal terminology (forces producing changes) and rely more on mathemat-
ical properties of the formalism. This opens up the possibility of new types
of explanation, for example those based on the existence of symmetries. By
way of illustration, if the action S (as defined above) does not explicitly
depend on time (i.e. if time does not occur in the formula for S in addition
to its implicit dependence on time via the coordinates and velocities—this
expresses “symmetry under time translation”), it can be shown that the
energy of the system remains constant over time (conservation of energy); if
the action does not depend on position (symmetry under space translation)
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it follows that momentum is conserved. These examples illustrate Noether’s
theorem, which in a general and systematic way links symmetries to the
conservation of physical quantities.
Summing up, what a mechanism is, and what a mechanistic explana-
tion amounts to, is not completely set in stone in classical mechanics. In
the course of history a development into the direction of more complicated
and intuitively less immediately attractive “mechanisms” has proven neces-
sary. A constant theme in this development (until the advent of quantum
mechanics, about which more in a moment) has been the notion that a sys-
tem should be decomposed in its constituent particles and that the whole
should be understood on the basis of the dynamics of these parts. All these
various mechanistic explanations make use of intuitively plausible causal
terminology (forces, production, unfolding in time) and often provide un-
derstanding. However, within the same science of classical mechanics more
abstract explanations (on the basis of variational principles, symmetries, or
abstract properties of the mathematical structure) are possible as well, and
actually occur more frequently in advanced treatments of the subject. So
explanation by “mechanisms” is not inextricably bound up with the science
of mechanics: mechanics is more flexible than that, and more neutral with
respect to possible patterns of explanation.
3 Maxwell’s Theory and Poincare´’s Theorem
The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw the introduction of several
new types of matter, “fluids”, for the purpose of explaining phenomena
in a number of relatively new disciplines: chemistry, the theory of heat,
and most famous and important for our topic, electrodynamics. It was
mentioned in the previous section that a Newtonian treatment of moving
electrical charges meets with difficulties and requires the introduction of
action-at-a-distance forces of a new and unusual sort. The introduction of
the electromagnetic ether and the development of the field concept, culmi-
nating in Maxwell’s theory of electrodynamics of 1865, cast new light on this
subject. Instead of thinking in terms of action at a distance between par-
ticles, Maxwell proposed to conceptualize the interaction between charges
as mediated by undulations in an underlying medium—waves that propa-
gated, with a finite velocity, between the charges. This new “field-theoretic”
framework was a huge success: Maxwell was able to unify electricity, mag-
netism and optics within the same theory. As he wrote [9]: “[It seems] that
light and magnetism are affections of the same substance, and that light is
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an electromagnetic disturbance propagated through the field according to
electromagnetic laws.” Maxwell’s new, general and comprehensive theory of
electromagnetism made the earlier direct-action attempts obsolete.
In his 1873 Treatise on Electricity and Magnetism [10] Maxwell presented
his definitive treatment of the theory, in which electrodynamic quantities
were represented by vectors, as still usual today: for example,
−→
E stands
for the electric field and
−→
B for the “magnetic induction”. In the rapidly
following further development of the discipline these vectors came to stand
for locally (i.e. per spatial point) defined forces, existing throughout the
medium (the ether), so that we have a continuous “field” of electric and
magnetic forces
−→
E (x) and
−→
B(x), with x indicating position. These forces
are “felt” by localized charged particles that find themselves at the position
x. As derived by Lorentz (see [4]), the force exerted on a particle with
electrical charge e and velocity −→v , at position x in the field, is given by−→
F = e
−→
E (x) + e−→v ∧ −→B (with ∧ denoting the outer product between two
vectors).
The core of the theory developed in the Treatise [10] is formed by the
“Maxwell equations”, which govern the dynamics of the electric and mag-
netic fields. After a long chain of arguments, Maxwell’s presentation cul-
minates in the demonstration that this dynamics can be put in Lagrangian
form.
The final result is a theory in which we have field quantities defined
throughout space and interrelated by a set of equations (the Maxwell equa-
tions). These fields exert influences on charged particles, and charged parti-
cles in turn influence the fields; this is all described in a rigorous and abstract
mathematical way. Significantly, Maxwell states that in the final analysis
these field quantities express the mechanical state of the underlying sub-
stance, the ether. But it is not worked out how exactly this should be fleshed
out: in what way does the state of motion of the material ether generate
electric and magnetic fields, and how should we envisage the interaction
between charged particles and the moving parts of the ether?
In 1890 Henri Poincare´ published a book, E´lectricite´ et Optique [11],
meant to explain Maxwell’s theory to the French-speaking world. Poincare´
starts his Introduction with the remark that for a French reader the first ac-
quaintance with Maxwell’s text will probably lead to a feeling of embarrass-
ment and even distrust—as Poincare´ states, this feeling will only disappear
after much effort, and some eminent minds even keep it for ever.2 Accord-
2La premie`re fois qu’un lecteur franc¸ais ouvre le livre de Maxwell, un sentiment de
malaise et souvent meˆme de de´fiance se meˆle d’abord a` son admiration. Ce n’est qu’apre`s
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ing to Poincare´ there are several reasons for this reaction: the French reader
wants logic, consistency and precision, preferably in the form of a deductive
system with a minimum number of clearly stated axioms, and Maxwell’s
work does not possess this form. But there is also another reason. Behind
the world of experience the French reader will wish to see another world,
consisting of matter with purely geometric properties, with atoms that are
point particles subjected to mechanical laws. Only then will he have the
feeling that he has penetrated to the secret of the Universe.3
Poincare´ expresses doubt about the philosophical tenability of this latter
geometrical/mechanical requirement; he thinks that it concedes too much
to our intuitive urge for easily visualizable pictures. Anyway, at this point
in his Introduction Poincare´ warns his readers that desires for an elegant
axiomatic set-up and a simple and obvious mechanistic explanation will not
be satisfied by Maxwell. However, and this is according to Poincare´ meant to
be Maxwell’s most important general message to the reader of the Treatise,
Maxwell does show that a mechanistic explanation of electric and magnetic
phenomena is possible in principle.4 To show that this conclusion is indeed
contained in Maxwell’s work, Poincare´ proves a little theorem, still in the
Introduction to his book [11, ix-xiv].
The proof hinges on the fact that Maxwell’s theory can be given a La-
grangian formulation, as emphasized in the Treatise. Quite generally, as
Poincare´ is going to show, theories with a Lagrangian formulation admit a
mechanical model in which masses that interact via forces derivable from a
potential can be made responsible for what the theory predicts on the ob-
servable level. The idea of the proof is simple. Any physical theory should
make contact with experience, and should therefore operate with physical
quantities, q1, q2, ..., qn, that are accessible to measurement. If the theory
can be put in Lagrangian form, this means that there exists a potential en-
ergy function V (q) of the quantities q1, q2, ..., qn, and also a kinetic energy
function T (q, q˙) of these quantities and their time derivatives, so that the
Lagrangian L = T − V can be formed.
Now, if there is to be a mechanical model, it should be possible to find p
un commerce prolonge´ et aux prix de beaucoup d’efforts, que ce sentiment se dissipe.
Quelques esprits e´minents le conservent meˆme toujours.
3Derrie`re la matie`re qu’atteignent nos sens et que l’expe´rience nous fait connaˆıtre,
il voudra voir une autre matie`re, la seule ve´ritable a` ses yeux, qui n’aurait plus que
des qualite´s purement ge´ome´triques et dont les atomes ne seront plus que des points
mathe´matiques soumis aux seules lois de la Dynamique... C’est alors seulement qu’il sera
pleinement satisfait et s’imaginera avoir pe´netre´ le secret de l’Univers.
4Maxwell ne donne pas une explication me´chanique de l’e´lectricite´ et du magne´tisme;
il se borne a de´montrer que cette explication est possible [italics in original].
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values of masses, m1,m2, ...,mp, and p positions x1, x2, ..., xp, of p particles
that together determine the measurable quantities q1, q2, ..., qn and in turn
are functions of these measurable quantities: xi = xi(q1, q2, ..., qn).
5 The
kinetic energy, when expressed in the particle quantities, should have the
usual particle form: T (q, q˙) =
∑p
i=1
1
2mix˙
2
i . Since we are interested in the
existence in principle of a mechanical model, no limit is set to the value of
p, so that one may assume as many particles as one likes.
With this freedom in the number of particles it is always possible to sat-
isfy the equation for the kinetic energy, T (q, q˙) =
∑p
i=1
1
2mix˙
2
i : the number
of unknowns, p can be made much greater than the number n of known
quantities. We therefore have a case of mathematical underdetermination,
and there will be infinitely many possible choices for the masses and posi-
tions.
Given any such choice, we can rewrite the potential energy V as a func-
tion of the particle positions, and the Lagrangian equations of motion be-
come: mix¨i = − dVdxi . So we have arrived at a theoretical scheme in which p
moving particles, interacting via forces − dVdxi , fully reproduce the empirical
predictions of the theory with which we started.
In other words, under very general conditions (the existence of a La-
grangian scheme) it is possible to find many mechanical models that lead
to the exact same predictions as the given physical theory. These models
will contain a number of point masses, interacting through local forces that
derive from a potential. As said, there is no lack of such models: due to the
underdetermination signalled above, if there is one such model, there is an
infinity of them.6
Seen from this perspective, mechanical explanation is always possible—
but it is cheap and resembles a sleight-of-hand. It seems an empty addition
to what we could already understand in terms of the quantities q alone. As
Poincare´ discusses further in La Science et l’Hypothe`se [12, 196-197; 251-
259], one might initially think that requirements concerning the form of
the forces will give the concept of mechanical explanation more bite; for
example, one could impose that the forces should be central, or expressible
as fixed connections in the manner of Hertz, or perhaps reducible to the
effects of direct particle collisions. But given the freedom to choose the
number of particles p as large as one wishes, this will not help: the problem
5More precisely, each particle position has three components in three-dimensional
space, so that there are four unknowns associated with each particle.
6As Poincare´ [11, xiv] puts it: “Si donc un phe´nome`ne comporte une explication
me´chanique comple`te, il en comportera une infinite´ d’autres qui rendront e´galement bien
compte de toutes les particularite´s re´ve´le´es par l’expe´rience.” [italics in original]
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will remain underdetermined and there will still be infinitely many solutions.
Poincare´ concludes that the choice for a mechanistic explanation will
necessarily involve non-empirical, personal and pragmatic factors. He sug-
gests that future physicists will no longer be interested in thinking about
such things and will leave this to metaphysicians; and that in the end the
reader of Maxwell’s Treatise will see the artificial elements in the [mechani-
cal] theoretical schemes that he once admired.7
4 Mechanisms and Quantum Mechanics
A common theme in the various forms of mechanistic explanation that we
have considered is that they are decompositional [13]: the behavior of a com-
posite system is explained by reference to its material parts and the inter-
actions between these parts. This has become the motivation for the “New
Mechanicism” in the philosophy of science. This New Mechanicism is meant
to be an elaboration of and improvement on Salmon’s causal scheme of ex-
planation, according to which good explanations are ontologically grounded
in the objectively existing causal structure of the world [14]. The new me-
chanicists share this “ontic” commitment, but work out the details of the
causal structure in a way that is slightly different from Salmon’s original
proposals, namely in terms of mechanisms, defined as complex, composite
systems whose efficacy in performing a certain function can be understood
on the basis of the concerted action of its parts. Glennan gives the following
definition [7]:
a mechanism for a behavior is a complex system that produces
that behavior by the interaction of a number of parts, where
the interactions between parts can be characterized by direct,
invariant, change-relating generalizations.
This definition accords well with the nature of the mechanisms that passed
review in our historical sketch of classical mechanics. In particular, the be-
havior to be explained is produced by the interactions between the parts;
and as Glennan explains, these parts must be objects with a high degree of
robustness or stability, which are generally spatially localized. The interac-
tions bring about changes in the properties of one part as a consequence of
7Un jour viendra peut-eˆtre ou` les physiciens se de´sinte´resseront de ces questions, in-
accessibles aux me´thodes positives, et les abandonneront aux me´taphysiciens. ... Le
lecteur...finit par comprendre ce qu’il y avait souvent d’un peu artificiel dans les ensem-
bles the´oriques qu’il admirait autrefois [12, 258-259].
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changes in the properties of another [7, S344]. As Glennan adds concerning
these interactions [7, S352], “events occurring at some point in space and
time are explained as the consequence of the operation of causal mechanisms
operating in that region of space and time. Our global evidence suggests
that—quantum mechanics aside—causality is everywhere local.”
The picture is that explanation by mechanisms is ontologically privileged
as it latches on to the objective structure of the world: the world consists of
composite objects whose behavior is produced by local interactions between
localized component systems. It is important for this new mechanicism, as
it was for older forms of mechanicism, that the interaction between any two
components should be the same as in the case in which these components are
the only systems present: the interactions should not be “holistic”, depend-
ing on the behaviour of the complex system that is to be explained. The
mechanistic intuition is that the global system should be reducible to its
parts. No wonder then that Glennan added the clause “quantum mechanics
aside” in the just-quoted statement: quantum mechanics is notorious for
the problems it engenders for practically all of the mentioned ingredients of
mechanistic explanation: according to quantum mechanics, physical systems
need not be localized, interactions possess non-local aspects, and perhaps
most important of all, the properties of a composite system can generally
not be reduced to the properties of its parts.
There is one underlying reason for all these problems. Von Neumann
already pointed out, in his seminal 1932 book on the mathematical structure
of quantum mechanics [15], that the central novel feature of quantum theory
is that states of physical systems are to be represented by vectors in a state
space (a Hilbert space), with the property that the superposition (sum) of
any two such vector states again represents a realizable state. Accordingly,
the structure of the quantum state space is radically different from what we
are used to in classical physics. For example, if we have two vector quantum
states denoted by |x1〉 and |x2〉, meant to refer to a system at position
x1 and x2, respectively, the sum state
1√
2
(|x1〉 + |x2〉) is again a bona-fide
state—but this time we have a state that does not correspond to one definite
localization. The superposition principle, saying that any two states may be
superposed to form a new state in which a physical system can find itself,
is responsible for most non-classical features of quantum mechanics.
In particular, the superposition principle explains why the state of a com-
posite quantum system generally cannot be reconstructed from the states
of its component parts. Suppose that we have a system C that consists of
the two partial systems A and B; and suppose that possible states of A and
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B are ({|α〉i} and {|β〉i} (these are vectors in the Hibert spaces associated
with A and B, respectively). In this situation, a simple composite state of
C is
|Ψ〉 = |α〉k ⊗ |β〉k, (1)
which can be interpreted in a classical way: The system C (represented by
|Ψ〉, a vector in the Hilbert space associated with C) consists of two compo-
nents, A and B, with states |α〉k and |β〉k, respectively, and the properties
of C supervene on these of A and B. The crucial point is that the superpo-
sition principle tells us that a superposition of states of the form (1) is also
possible, which leads to a state of the form:
|Ψ〉 =
∑
i
ci|α〉i ⊗ |β〉i, (2)
where |α〉i and |β〉i are again state vectors in the Hilbert spaces of A and
B, respectively, and the coefficients ci are complex numbers. In the situa-
tion represented by Eq. 2 the global system C is in a so-called pure state
(represented by a vector in Hilbert space), but the partial systems A and B,
taken by themselves, are in “mixed states”. This can be intuitively under-
stood from Eq. 2 because both A and B are associated with a whole range
of state vectors ({|α〉i} and {|β〉i}, respectively) so that it is not implausible
that they are best represented by a mixture of these states. Now, as von
Neumann showed, it is a mathematical fact that |Ψ〉 fully determines the
mixed states of A and B, but that the reverse is not true: The mixed states
of the component systems, in a situation of the type represented by Eq. 2,
do not fix the state of C, i.e. |Ψ〉. It follows from this that knowledge of
all physical properties of A and B individually, and all possible outcomes
of measurements performed on A and B by themselves, does not suffice to
determine the state of C. There thus exists a certain holism in quantum
mechanics: properties of a whole do generally not supervene on properties
of the parts.
The answer to the question of whether one can think of composite quan-
tum systems as being built up from parts that interact via local interactions
( a “local model”) relates to the just-sketched holism. As famously proved by
Bell [2], it is impossible in certain total states of the form (2) to reproduce,
with a local model, the quantum mechanical predictions for the correlations
between outcomes of measurements performed on A and B separately. The
relevant quantum mechanical predictions have been impressively confirmed
in many experiments, so that the conclusion is justified that nature is not
correctly described by models with local interactions between parts—which
clearly are mechanisms of the sort discussed earlier.
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We already mentioned the general lack of localizability of quantum sys-
tems, which leads to another discrepancy between the quantum ontology
and the ontology of local mechanisms. Since quantum states may be super-
positions of states that are (more or less) localized, the resulting states can
have very extended spatial domains. This is important for practical applica-
tions, as illustrated by the famous “double-slit” example, in which a single
electron goes to two slits at the same time, in spite of a substantial distance
between the slits. In the beginning days of quantum theory examples like
this were mere thought experiments, but now they are routinely realized in
laboratories and prove to be important for practical applications.8
The quantum world is therefore strange and radically non-classical, as
emphasized in many accounts of the theory. Nevertheless, it is clear that if
the theory is to be empirically adequate, classical patterns of behavior have
to emerge in some situations—after all, there must be a reason that classical
mechanics was successful for so long a time. If there were no classical limit-
ing situations, classical physics would never have developed. The details of
the classical limit of quantum mechanics are to some extent controversial,
because they relate to interpretational issues (in particular, the measure-
ment problem). However, there is a growing consensus that the process of
“decoherence” is of vital importance here.
Decoherence occurs when a quantum system couples to its environment—
usually an environment with very many degrees of freedom, which makes
the process practically irreversible. The interaction with this environment
is governed by the usual quantum mechanical evolution (the Schro¨dinger
equation or a relativistic generalization of it); it is a case of ordinary quan-
tum mechanical interaction. As we shall see in a moment, one of the effects
of decoherence is that the effects of entanglement and superposition become
hard to detect.
An entangled state has the general form shown in Eq. 2. Now suppose
that there is an environment E that interacts with the system in the state
|Ψ〉 of Eq. 2, such that E responds differently to the different terms in (2).
8We here follow standard interpretational ideas, staying close to the standard Hilbert
space formalism. The interpretation of quantum mechanics is notoriously controversial,
and there are proposals that differ from the standard account. The difficulties mentioned
in the text assume different forms depending on the interpretation that is being considered,
but in any interpretation there remain holistic and non-local features. For example, in
the Bohm version of quantum mechanics [3] particles are localized, but they interact via
non-local forces of a holistic sort: the form of these action-at-a-distance forces depends on
the quantum state of the composite object. So also here there is no supervenience of the
whole on the parts.
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This can be represented mathematically by the following evolution:
|Ψ〉|E0〉 =
∑
i
ci|α〉i ⊗ |β〉i|E0〉 7→
∑
i
ci|α〉i ⊗ |β〉i|Ei〉. (3)
In this formula the symbol 7→ represents the evolution: this evolution
maps the initial state on the left hand side of the symbol into the final state
on the right hand side. |E0〉 is the initial environment state; the states
|Ei〉 are the environment states that couple to the states |α〉i ⊗ |β〉i of the
composite object.
The crucial fact that makes decoherence so important is the following.
When one performs a measurement on the composite system alone, after its
interaction with the environment E, the typical effects of entanglement will
be blurred. In the extreme case that the states |Ei〉 are mutually orthogonal
(i.e. the states are without any overlap—this is the case if the environment
responds completely differently to the various states |α〉i ⊗ |β〉i) the effects
of entanglement will even become completely invisible in measurements on
the composite system alone (i.e. if one does not look at E).9
It should be noted, however, that this disappearance of entanglement is
not only approximate, but also relative to a limited class of observations. As
inspection of Eq. 3 demonstrates, the total state of the original composite
system plus its environment is still entangled—the process of decoherence
has merely spread out the original entanglement so that it now also involves
the environment E. As a consequence, observations of the original system
plus the environment with which it has interacted will show the entangled
nature of the total state, with its non-classical and non-local characteristics.
However, it is true that if one restricts oneself to measurements on open
systems without looking at their environments, and if one’s measurements
are not too precise, quantum effects will often10 not manifest themselves and
classical models of what happens will become possible. Another important
consequence of decoherence is that open quantum systems in environments
9Formally, the essential difference between the situations before and after interaction
with the environment is that initially the expectation value of any operator O of the
composite system alone is given by 〈Ψ|O|Ψ〉 =∑i,j c∗i cj〈αiβi|O|αjβj〉, whereas after the
interaction with the environment this becomes
∑
i,j c
∗
i cj〈αiβi|O|αjβj〉〈Ei|Ej〉. The inner
products 〈Ei|Ej〉 that have appeared tend to wash out the “cross terms”, with i 6= j—
these cross terms are needed to show the presence of entanglement. In the extreme case of
orthogonality between different environment states we have 〈Ei|Ej〉 = 0 if i 6= j, so that
the effects of entanglement vanish completely from sight.
10In particular, in the circumstances of everyday observation. In laboratory experiments
it turns out that quantum effects affecting even macroscopic objects can be made visible—
these experiments on so-called Schro¨dinger cat states have become almost routine now.
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of the kind we are used to tend to become localized. This is because the usual
interactions (electromagnetism, gravity) are sensitive to position, with the
consequence that (practically) orthogonal environment states will become
correlated to object states associated with different positions. By virtue
of the same argument as before, superpositions of different positions will
therefore become practically unobservable.
Summing up, quantum mechanics describes a world that is basically non-
local and holistic, with properties of composite systems that generally do not
supervene on the properties of their parts. But the process of decoherence is
able to hide these typical quantum features from view. In particular, when
we make observations on Earth, outside a fundamental physics laboratory,
models on the basis of classical physics will normally work very well.
So we may conclude that quantum mechanics leaves room for mechanistic
explanations: there is a limited domain of quantum phenomena, defined
by a) a restriction on which parts of a total system are investigated, b)
a limitation on the accuracy with which these investigations are carried
out, and c) the presence of decoherence processes, in which mechanistic
models apply. This seems in accordance with a conclusion recently drawn
by Kuhlmann and Glennan, who write [8, 353]
that decoherence provides a useful explanation of why, in par-
ticular local circumstances, systems behave classically in spite of
their being ultimately constituted of entities that obey the prin-
ciples of quantum mechanics, and that this explanation deflects
possible concerns over the ontological and explanatory legitimacy
of the mechanistic approach.
However, one should not overrate this result.11 Although mechanistic models
usually make extremely accurate predictions in familiar “classical” settings,
taken completely literally these predictions are, even though very close, still
wrong: a purely quantum mechanical calculation, taking into account en-
tanglement and the non completely vanishing values of the factors 〈Ei|Ej〉
(see note 9) will give other and, importantly, better predictions. So there are
features of reality, detectable in principle, that show that the literal content
of the ontological claims of the mechanistic explanation strategy is false.
11Kuhlmann and Glennan sometimes make statements that create the (what would be a
mistaken) impression that there is absolutely nothing wrong with mechanistic explanations
in semi-classical contexts, even given the validity of quantum mechanics; e.g. they say “In
this paper we argue, in part by appeal to the theory of quantum decoherence, that the
universal validity of quantum mechanics does not undermine neo-mechanistic ontological
and explanatory claims as they occur within classical domains” [8, 337].
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The situation can be compared to others that we already encountered.
Mechanical explanation by central forces, even though it was for some time
the paradigm of mechanical explanation, turned out to be empirically in-
adequate when electrodynamic phenomena were investigated more exten-
sively and in more detail. The law of Coulomb, according to which two
electrical charges attract or repel each other by an inverse-square central
force (in analogy to Newton’s law of gravity) had to be replaced by a more
complicated law for moving charges (this more complicated interaction can
be derived from Maxwell’s equations). Now, in many circumstances—in
particular those that were familiar to researchers in the beginning of the
nineteenth century—Coulomb’s law still yields excellent predictions in spite
of this complication. This is because the charges under investigation often
do not move too fast—although they always move somewhat and are never
perfectly stationary—and the deviations from Coulomb’s law are minute
anyway, hardly observable without ultra-sensitive experimental techniques.
So there is a certain domain of electrodynamic phenomena that in spite
of the validity of Maxwell’s theory can be handled perfectly well, for all
practical purposes, with the older Coulomb theory. Does this justify the
conclusion that Maxwell’s electrodynamics does not undermine the older
ontological and explanatory claims? It seems clear that this is not the case.
True, explanations by means of the Coulomb theory can often still be main-
tained after Maxwell, but these explanations depend for their ontological
grounding on Maxwell’s electrodynamics plus an argument that the new
dynamical effects that occur (e.g., loss of energy by radiation) fall below
the threshold of observational accuracy. Similar comments apply to many
other examples from the practice of physics, in which explanations are still
given on the basis of obsolete and false theories.12 In all these cases the
original ontological basis of the explanations is undermined, but this does
not exclude that the explanations themselves, as argumentative patterns,
are still useful.
12It is sometimes argued that it is impossible to give valid explanations on the basis of
false theories at all (see [5], and the volume of which that essay is a chapter, for recent
discussions on this topic). We do not agree that it is impossible to explain without literal
truth (see the next section)—but if this impossibility were to be accepted, this would
clearly call the mechanist ideal into question in a more radical way than we do here.
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5 Conclusion: Mechanisms, Explanations and Un-
derstanding in Physics
Even within classical mechanics the status of mechanistic explanation is not
unchallenged. It is true that in the days when the theory was first proposed
the new ideal according to which all physical processes should be explained as
the result of pushes and pulls sparked off great enthusiasm, but this ideal had
soon to be abandoned. The rules of mechanicism had to be stretched, first
by admitting central action-at-a-distance forces, then by allowing the forces
to become more complicated. The reason, of course, was the development
of physical theory: theoretical schemes along Cartesian lines proved to be
empirically inadequate, after some time central forces shared this fate, and
not long thereafter the whole concept of action-at-a-distance forces became
obsolete. In the meantime new mathematical frameworks had developed for
the formulation of classical mechanics, like the Lagrangian an Hamiltonian
formalisms, and these gave rise to very different patterns of explanation, for
example via variational principles.
Still, even though the Cartesian push and pull paradigm has long been
left behind as a fundamental and general scientific scheme, explanations
along these lines remain useful. For example, even if we think that interac-
tions between bodies are always mediated by fields (perhaps quantum fields)
or complicated action-at-a-distance forces, it usually helps to visualize such
interactions via the picture of Cartesian collisions—physics textbooks are
full of pictures of this kind, even if the subject is quantum field theory. This
is because simple mechanistic models, if they yield results that are not too
far off the mark, provide us with qualitative understanding of a process:
they enable us to see, without entering into detailed calculations, what the
approximate outcome of a process will be. The familiarity of the push and
pull scheme makes it intuitively manageable.
The same comments apply to the other types of mechanistic explana-
tion. For example, even in the context of general relativity it often helps
to think of the gravitational attraction between material bodies in terms of
the conceptual framework of Newton’s theory. Why is it that light cannot
escape from a black hole? Because the black hole is so massive that the
gravitational force it exerts on light pulls the light towards the black hole so
strongly that it cannot get away. Is is easy to understand the process this
way, and it requires a lot more training to become equally familiar with the
general relativistic scheme of null-geodesics, horizons and the Einstein field
equations. Nevertheless, it is not impossible at all to acquire an intuitive
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familiarity with such advanced mathematical schemes; seasoned researchers
do not need to make detailed calculations in order to make a qualitative
judgment about, e.g., to what extent a solution of the field equations will
deviate from Euclidean geometry, given a particular mass distribution.
The Lagrangian approach to classical mechanics, with its variational
principle, illustrates our general point further. Although this approach per-
tains to cases in which Newtonian explanations that use forces are certainly
also possible, there are circumstances in which one may nevertheless prefer
an explanation along Lagrangian lines. This may happen if one wants to
avoid anthropomorphic or indexical elements in one’s explanations (see the
discussion about the flow of time and four-dimensionality in section 2), or if
one wishes to lay stress on the continuity between classical mechanics and
relativity theory; or on the analogies between mechanics and optics. Ex-
planations via the Lagrangian framework are certainly not less ontologically
grounded than their Newtonian causal counterparts: the structure of the
four-dimensional world is such that it obeys variational principles—if any-
thing, it is the Newtonian mechanistic explanation, with its production of
effects during the flow of time that can be accused of introducing subjec-
tive elements. Moreover, in many cases one can develop an intuitive feeling
for the outcome of variational arguments so that they make it possible to
achieve understanding. For example, it is understandable why the trajectory
of a free particle will be a straight line, as this path realizes the shortest dis-
tance. Also in cases with more complicated Lagrangians a similar geometric
interpretation often makes it easy to make qualitative statements about the
form of trajectories as shortest connection in some geometry.
We know from section 3 that mechanistic explanations will be available
in principle as soon as a Lagrangian scheme applies—for this, the Lagrangian
does not even need to depend on mechanical quantities at all. What is more,
there will be infinitely many different mechanistic explanations, of any sort
one wishes: using contact forces, action at a distance, etc. It hardly needs
argumentation, though, that this abundance does not help to enhance the
attractiveness of such explanations: they will as a rule be too unwieldy,
complicated and unnatural to be taken seriously. Clearly, the mere fact that
the explanations in question are mechanistic does not compensate for this
disadvantage—such “Poincare´ schemes” are artificial and unenlightening,
even though they are able to reproduce all empirical results correctly.
What this all points to is that explanation and understanding in physics
are not restricted to one privileged standard format. There are usually sev-
eral forms of explanation available, and which type is actually chosen in a
particular situation depends on contextual factors like the exact question
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that is being asked (and its “contrast class”), the intended use of the expla-
nation, and the conceptual framework that is adopted. The same applies
to the notion of understanding. Since understanding is a more qualitative
concept than explanation and also depends on factors like the skill of the
actor who is involved and his/her familiarity with the theoretical framework,
there is even more freedom here than in the case of explanation [6, 5]. In
particular, it is not unusual to achieve understanding of physical processes
with the help of obsolete theories that have been proven wrong when taken
literally. Such theories may in spite of their incorrectness provide tools by
which one can attain an intuitive grip on a process, and succeed in foresee-
ing its outcome in a qualitative way. This is particularly true for theories
that use mechanical concepts. Quantum mechanics has supplanted these
theories, but mechanical reasoning may still provide a conceptual grip on
certain phenomena.
A final example may be useful here. In their plea that the validity of
mechanistic explanation is not undermined by quantum mechanics, Kuhlmann
and Glennan write [8, 357]
why do flocks of birds so often form the inverted-l-shaped form
often seen in autumn? A mechanistic explanation explains how
this local phenomenon arises through the local interaction of the
birds; global entanglement between the birds (and their con-
stituents) and the rest of the universe are (to a high approxima-
tion) not causally or explanatorily relevant to the production of
this phenomenon.
This is exactly right if construed as a proposal for one way of understanding
how the shape of a flock of birds arises. But note that a mechanistic expla-
nation in terms of productive forces is not the only possibility of achieving
such understanding: a Lagrangian variational approach (e.g., in this case,
in terms of finding a constellation of birds with maximum stability, by min-
imizing an energy expression) would work as well; it depends on contextual
factors which approach is preferred.
Note further that the mechanical theory invoked in the explanation of
the form of the birds flock is, taken literally, wrong (as acknowledged in
the quotation by the addition of “to a high approximation”). Quantum
theory is taken to be the more correct theory here, and it is in fundamental
conflict with classical mechanics. It follows that a better explanation than
the suggested mechanistic one is available if one is interested in the highest
attainable predictive accuracy. It is true that the differences in cases like
this will normally be astronomically small, but still in principle the suggested
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mechanical model will give results that are wrong in its details. The general
statement that the quantum aspects of the situation are not causally or
explanatorily relevant is therefore false. It depends on the perspective that
is taken whether or not entanglement and other quantum aspects should
be taken into account. From an already taken mechanical vantage point
they do not play a role; from the perspective of quantum mechanics they
are relevant. In particular, these very quantum aspects determine whether
an approximate account in mechanistic terms will be viable at all; they are
thus certainly relevant in an explanatory sense.
We therefore conclude that on the fundamental ontological level physics
has moved away from mechanisms: quantum mechanics is fundamentally at
odds with the image of composite systems whose properties are produced by
the properties of their parts, via local interactions. In spite of this, for the
purposes of explanation and understanding mechanistic reasoning remains
an important conceptual tool. But it is not at all the only possible one: a
toolkit of conceptual instruments is available, and it depends on contextual
factors which one should be chosen.
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